讲座信息
Price Limits in a Tradable Performance Standard
主讲人：王班班 博士 华中科技大学经济学院
时 间：2018年12月6日 10：30
地 点：法商科研楼110会议室
主讲人简介：王班班，经济学博士、华中科技大学经济学院青年讲师、武汉大学气候变化与能源经济研究中心碳市场研究室主任。主讲人王班班博士于2017年12月至2018年11月受国家留学基金委资助，赴美国杜克大学公派访学，主要从事环境经济、能源经济方面的研究。本次研讨会上，王班班将简要介绍在美国的科研学习情况，汇报和研讨与杜克大学环境经济学家William A. Pizer教授的合作论文《Price Limits in a Tradable Performance Standard》。论文主要研究了在一种新的市场化环境政策——可交易绩效标准市场——引入价格管理的理论基础和实践问题。
论文摘要如下：
Tradable performance standards are widely used regulatory policies. Examples include the US lead phasedown, fuel economy standards for automobiles, renewable portfolio standards, low carbon fuel standards (LCFS), and—most recently—China’s new national carbon market. At the same time, theory and experience with traditional cap-and-trade programs suggests an important role for price limits in the form of floors, ceilings, and reserves. In this paper we develop a simple analytical model to show that the welfare comparison between tradable performance standards and a price-based alternative is a variant of the traditional Weitzman prices-versus-quantities result. We use this formula to estimate the gains to using price mechanisms in the California LCFS and China’s carbon market. Given prices are frequently favored, we then discuss practical issues regarding how a hybrid mechanism—price limits in a tradable performance standard—could be put into place.
论文摘要如下：
Tradable performance standards are widely used regulatory policies. Examples include the US lead phasedown, fuel economy standards for automobiles, renewable portfolio standards, low carbon fuel standards (LCFS), and—most recently—China’s new national carbon market. At the same time, theory and experience with traditional cap-and-trade programs suggests an important role for price limits in the form of floors, ceilings, and reserves. In this paper we develop a simple analytical model to show that the welfare comparison between tradable performance standards and a price-based alternative is a variant of the traditional Weitzman prices-versus-quantities result. We use this formula to estimate the gains to using price mechanisms in the California LCFS and China’s carbon market. Given prices are frequently favored, we then discuss practical issues regarding how a hybrid mechanism—price limits in a tradable performance standard—could be put into place.